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AT A GLANCE
•• The Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Points (HACCP) 
regulatory system for 
seafood processing plants 
has three components: 
a written plan created by 
the plant and approved by 
the FDA, maintenance of 
records by the plant, and 
monitoring by the FDA. 
•• Prior to the introduction of 
HACCP in the mid-1990s, 
the FDA regulated seafood 
safety through periodic 
inspections of hygiene and 
sanitation conditions of 
seafood processing plants. 
•• While the FDA is supposed 
to conduct annual 
inspections of all seafood 
processing plants, only 7% 
of the firms sampled were 
inspected annually.
•• Plants with previous 
food safety violations 
are not inspected any 
With recent peanut butter contamination, jalapeno problems, and spinach 
recalls, food safety has been receiving 
increased media attention. In April 
2011, the New York Times ran a story 
highlighting the uncoordinated and 
decentralized nature of programs 
designed to prevent and detect 
food-caused illnesses. The article 
characterized the system as a motley 
patchwork of poorly financed and 
poorly trained departments with 
enormous variation between states. 
Contamination of food with bacteria 
or fungi can cause problems ranging 
from mild discomfort to serious health 
illness and sometimes even death. 
According to the New York Times 
story, nearly a quarter of the United 
States population is sickened each year 
by contaminated food. Among those, 
approximately 300,000 people are 
hospitalized and 5,000 people 
actually die.
The safety and quality of our food 
has always been an important concern 
of both federal and local government. 
As food travels further, takes more time 
to reach our tables, and is produced 
with an increasing range of production 
methods, will regulatory agencies be 
able to provide adequate safeguards? 
And, however well our food safety 
systems currently work, could we make 
them better?
Dr. Anna Alberini and Dr. Erik 
Lichtenberg at the University of 
Maryland Department of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics address this 
question in their work on seafood 
safety regulations. In the American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
they and their co-authors Dominic 
Mancini and Gregmar Galinato note 
that increased incidence of food-borne 
illnesses prompted a new approach to 
How do new federal guidelines for food safety affect the behavior 
of seafood processors? How well are they working? Could they be 
improved? Dr. Anna Alberini and Dr. Erik Lichtenberg at the
University of Maryland take a closer look.
Seafood Safety Regulations: 
Do They Make Our Food Safer?
Seafood consumption accounts for a 
disproportionately large share of food-
caused sicknesses.
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Glance continued from page 1
more frequently than 
plants having no previous 
violations. 
•• FDA focuses greater 
attention on firms 
producing higher-risk 
seafood, specifically, 
smoked fish, cooked 
ready-to-eat products, and 
scombroid fish. 
•• Large seafood processing 
plants are more likely to be 
inspected than small ones.
•• For sanitation rules, the 
higher the likelihood of 
inspection, the lower the 
likelihood the plant will be 
in violation. In contrast, 
increased likelihood of 
inspection decreases 
compliance with HACCP 
regulations. This suggests 




standards rather than the 
HACCP rules, and that 
sanitation and HACCP 
regulations may be 
substitutes, competing for 
plant resources, rather than 
complements, sharing plant 
resources—at least during 
the initial period of HACCP 
implementation.
•• Sanitation compliance rates 
appear to improve over 
the early period of the new 
regulatory regime, whereas 
HAACP compliance did not.
food processing safety in the late 1990s. 
Lauded by some as a revolutionizing 
innovation to food safety regulation, the 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Points (HACCP) regulatory program 
was introduced with high expectations. 
Rather than replace the old system, 
it was added to the pre-existing food 
sanitation regulations to improve food 
processing practices.
In the United States, as in most 
developed economies, seafood 
consumption accounts for a 
disproportionately large share of food-
caused sicknesses. However, despite the 
prominence of seafood-related illness 
and its potential links with processing 
practices, little research exists on 
how HACCP has affected seafood 
processing. Many studies simply assume 
compliance with the rules and focus on 
issues such the impact of HACCP on 
the food industry structure. The question 
thus remains whether HACCP has been 
able to deliver on its promises.
Alberini and Lichtenberg have 
explicitly analyzed the new system’s 
ability (or inability) to induce 
compliance on the part of seafood 
processors with the new standards. 
Working with the seafood inspection 
records of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), they offer a 
preliminary evaluation of the system 
over its first years. They examine how 
the FDA targets its inspections, the 
effect of FDA inspections on plants’ 
compliance with standards, and the 
extent to which companies find it 
difficult to meet both the new standards 
and the old standards simultaneously.
The Seafood HACCP Program
The FDA is responsible for ensuring 
the safety of our seafood. Up until 
1997, the FDA’s approach was to 
perform periodic inspections of hygiene 
and sanitation conditions at seafood 
processing plants. Spurred partly by an 
up-tick in cases of food-caused illnesses, 
additional regulations were implemented 
in 1997 to make FDA oversight more 
effective at monitoring and ensuring 
food quality. 
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The HACCP program was 
introduced with great fanfare 
in the mid-1990s under the 
Clinton administration. A 
rigorously developed system 
based on principles of food 
safety engineering, HACCP was 
widely proclaimed as a high-
impact innovation that would 
significantly improve the safety 
of meat, poultry, and seafood 
products. The system has three 
components: a written plan 
created by the seafood processing 
firm, the maintenance of records 
by the firm, and monitoring by 
the FDA. FDA oversight occurs 
at two points—during the plan 
approval process and during 
follow-up inspections to verify 
that the firm is following the plan.
In order to improve the 
effectiveness of the HACCP 
program in preventing seafood-
caused illnesses, the FDA in 2002 
resolved to intensify inspection 
efforts on the three highest-risk 
foods. These include smoked 
fish, cooked ready-to-eat fish 
products, and scombroid fish (such 
as mackerel, tuna, sardines, and 
anchovies), which can produce 
toxic histamines if not refrigerated 
properly. With such high expectations 
for the new system, a natural question 
is: how has it done so far?
Why Doesn’t the Market Work? 
The Role of Regulation in 
Food Safety
Why can’t market forces simply 
induce food-handling firms to take 
the optimal level of precautions? 
In theory, companies competing 
with each other should voluntarily 
protect consumer health for fear of 
losing business to their competitors. 
That logic might lead us to expect a 
natural tendency for food processing 
businesses to regulate themselves. 
Even a few people sickened by a 
company’s products may negatively 
affect its image and reduce its sales. 
Unfortunately, things don’t usually 
work out this way.
In reality, it is very difficult to 
accurately identify the source of 
food-caused illnesses. The first 
problem is to determine whether 
food truly caused a particular 
sickness. Then, which food is to 
blame? Finally, one has to identify 
which party in the long chain 
connecting the sea to your dinner 
table is responsible. Was it those 
who caught the fish? The food 
processors? The supermarket 
or restaurant? The consumer’s 
handling of the food at home? 
These elements make it quite 
difficult to assign culpability for 
food-borne sicknesses and cause 
market incentives to break down.
Implementing safety 
precautions takes time, effort, 
and money—all of which reduce 
a food processing company’s 
profits. If there is no reliable 
way to assign liability and little 
scope for the market to react to 
food-safety failures by specific 
companies, there is little profit 
motive for taking safety measures. 
Consumers desire a much stronger 
guarantee of food safety and much 
lower risk of food contamination 
than firms may naturally be 
inclined to provide. To decrease 
the risks, we require regulation 
and monitoring by outside bodies 
such as the FDA.
Even with regulation, however, 
challenges remain. As long as 
food processing businesses are 
forced to operate at safety levels 
above those that they would 
naturally select on their own, they 
will always have a profit-driven 
incentive to take fewer precautions. 
Compounding this problem is 
the fact that precautionary effort 
is private information—only the 
firms themselves really know how 
much time and energy they put into 
ensuring food quality. This is why 
monitoring is necessary. Monitoring 
provides regulatory bodies with 
information about how well a firm is 
meeting food safety standards set for 
it. In the case of the FDA’s HACCP 
program, the agency watches over 
the seafood production process rather 
The Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points 
(HACCP) Program
Written Plan
Each seafood processing 
business must create a written 
plan that details how the food 
safety principles embodied in the 
HACCP are applied to its operating 
procedures. The FDA must 
approve the plan.
Records
Each seafood processing 
business must maintain records 
documenting how the firm is 
adhering to its FDA-approved plan 
for food safety standards.
FDA Monitoring
During the approval process 
and follow-up enforcement 
inspections, the FDA checks the 
firm’s paperwork, equipment, and 
production process to see how well 
it meets the HACCP standards.
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than directly monitor the quality of 
food products.
However, monitoring is imperfect. 
If FDA officials could observe all 
operations in all plants at all times, 
then the FDA could have perfect 
knowledge of the food-safety effort 
by each firm and precautionary 
effort would no longer be the private 
information of firms. Doing so is far 
too expensive. The best the FDA can 
do is to send officials regularly to 
plants. The more frequent the visits, 
and the more thorough the inspection 
upon each visit, the better the 
information the FDA has about the 
plant’s food quality. Of course, the 
higher the frequency and the greater 
the intensity of inspections, the more 
it costs the FDA to perform them. 
Impact of HACCP on the 
FDA Inspections and Plants 
Compliance
Given the importance of food-
safety regulatory bodies, evaluating 
the effectiveness of current methods 
and the impacts of changes in 
approaches is critical. In their 
research on the effects of the FDA’s 
new seafood HACCP program, 
Alberini and Lichtenberg examined 
the behavior of both the FDA and the 
seafood processing businesses being 
monitored. By exploring the impacts 
of the new two-tiered system during 
its nascent phase, they offer an initial 
glimpse at how the new approach is 
working and whether adjustments 
may be prudent.
Inspection Patterns
One of the most 
surprising findings is 
how rarely seafood 
processing firms are 
actually inspected. The 
firms are supposed to be 
inspected annually, but 
only seven percent of the firms in this 
study were inspected at least once a 
year. 
Alberini and Lichtenberg also 
found that the FDA does not seem 
to inspect plants that are most likely 
to have a violation with any greater 
frequency than other plants. In 
general, plants with previous food 
safety violations are not inspected 
with any greater intensity than plants 
having no previous violations. To 
be fair, there are some violations 
associated with the FDA returning 
to inspect sooner. For example, the 
interval between FDA inspections for 
a plant that was out of compliance 
with its HACCP plan is about 3 
percent shorter (23 days sooner), and 
the interval for plants found to have 
sanitation records not accurately 
describing actual plant conditions 
was 5 percent shorter (38 days 
sooner). However, other violations 
are actually associated with later 
re-inspections. The interval between 
inspections for plants which failed 
to develop its required HACCP plan 
was 7 percent longer (51 days later), 
and that for plants lacking sanitation 
monitoring records was 4 percent 
longer (30 days later).
Alberini and Lichtenberg did 
find evidence that the FDA focuses 
greater attention on firms producing 
the higher-risk seafood. Plants 
producing smoked fish have an 
average interval between inspections 
that is 16 percent shorter (153 
days) than that for other plants. The 
interval for plants producing breaded 
products is 7 percent shorter (48 
days). That for plants processing 
histamine-producing species (such 
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as tuna, anchovies, and sardines) is 4 
percent shorter (30 days).
Overall, however, they found that 
plant size ranks as the most important 
factor driving inspection intensity. 
Large plants (with annual sales above 
$1 million) have intervals between 
inspector visits which are about 
one-third shorter (245 days) than 
the interval for small plants (under 
$25,000 annual sales). Medium-sized 
plants (sales between $25,000 and $1 
million) have intervals that are about 
25 percent shorter (180 days) than 
those of the smallest plants. 
Alberini and Lichtenberg 
speculate that the FDA may assume 
that larger plants might pose greater 
potential health risks because more 
people consume their products. 
However, the practice may instead 
result from tight FDA budgetary 
constraints and the opportunity to 
inspect multiple processes within 
the same firm on the same day when 
inspecting large firms. Regardless, 
this inspection pattern poses an 
important risk. If large plants have a 
greater incentive to be in compliance 
than smaller plants, the FDA is 
focusing its efforts on those least 
likely to require them.
Compliance Patterns
As for the behavior of seafood 
processing plants under the 
new regulatory regime, their 
performance is far from perfect. 
Based on inspections of seafood 
processing plants by state and federal 
inspectors from the onset of the 
HACCP program through the end 
of 2001, Alberini and Lichtenberg 
documented substantial violations of 
seafood safety standards by all firms. 
Forty-six percent of the plants in 
their sample had at least one HACCP 
violation. Forty-three percent 
were observed to have a sanitation 
deficiency. Forty-seven percent had 
inadequate monitoring records or no 
monitoring records.
Alberini and Lichtenberg also 
found important differences between 
compliance with the older sanitation 
rules and the new HACCP rules. The 
higher the likelihood of a sanitation 
inspection, the lower the likelihood 
the plant will be in violation. That 
is, a higher probability of being 
inspected appears to improve 
compliance with sanitation rules.
In stark contrast, increased 
likelihood of an HACCP inspection 
appears to actually decrease 
compliance with the regulations. 
Furthermore, plants that followed 
sanitation rules in the past were no 
more likely to follow HACCP rules. 
These findings suggest that food 
safety compliance behavior remains 
oriented towards sanitation standards 
rather than the new HACCP rules. 
They also suggest that the two 
types of safety standards (sanitation 
and HACCP) may be substitutes 
(competing for plant resources) 
rather than complements (sharing 
plant resources). That is, plants with 
limited resources may have to choose 
which standards to follow, unable 
to comply with both. Choosing to 
follow sanitation standards may 
make it more likely they will violate 
HACCP standards.
In addition, plants producing the 
higher-risk seafood products are 
more likely to violate their HACCP 
plans, despite intensified inspection 
of such plants by the FDA. For 
sanitation standards this trend 
is much less pronounced. Plants 
processing smoked fish, however, 
were more likely to violate sanitation 
standards than other plants. 
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appear to slightly improve over this 
early period of the new regulatory 
regime. However, compliance with 
the HACCP rules exhibits little to 
no advances. 
Towards an Improved Inspection 
Regime
Introduced with great fanfare, the 
HACCP program has been lauded as the 
most effective method to improve safety 
in food processing operations. Perhaps it 
deserves such praise. Yet it is important 
to recall that any regulatory system will 
only be as good as its enforcement. 
Careful evaluation of the new program’s 
practical implementation, and of its 
effects on the actual behavior of food 
processing firms, is crucial before 
claiming success. While very little 
analysis has been done in this direction, 
the research of Alberini and Lichtenberg 
brings us closer.
Using FDA seafood inspection 
records and new methods of analysis, 
Alberini and Lichtenberg have 
shown that the first few years of the 
program have been rocky. Given 
limited resources, some firms appear 
to be ignoring the new rules. While 
compliance with the old rules improved 
from 1998 to 2001, compliance with 
HACCP stayed flat. The FDA does not 
appear to target past violators with any 
greater intensity and seems instead to 
focus its efforts on the largest firms, 
which may not reflect the most effective 
approach to reducing contamination 
risks. Finally, the FDA inspects firms 
much less often than the annual standard, 
sometimes going for as long as three or 
four years between inspections. 
It is important to note that this study 
covers just the first four years of the 
HACCP program. There might be an 
adjustment process that has simply been 
slow to begin. Nevertheless, given the 
absence of research into compliance 
behavior of food-processing businesses 
and the factors driving FDA inspections, 
this work provides the first serious look 
at the effectiveness of seafood safety 
regulations in the United States.  n
For more information about 
this research, contact 
Dr. Anna Alberini at 
(301)405-1267 or
aalberini@arec.umd.edu,or
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